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This thesis examines the management function from the per-
spective of a Navy Weapons Acquisition Program Manager. It is
hypothesized that control is a key variable to success. To be
in control, a program manager must make significant decisions
in the process of fulfilling his basic mission. To be effec-
j
tive, those decisions must be informed decisions.
The first half of this thesis effort establishes a concep-
tual base for the subsequent development of a practical frame-
work for management control in an ongoing acquisition project.
Chapters two and three report the results of an analysis of
the literature on control and information management. The
conceptual study concludes with an examination of two theoret-
ical frameworks, a brief look at the Navy program manager and
how he fits into these two frameworks, followed by a summary
description of three control systems used in the Navy today.
The second half of the effort presents a proposal for a
management control system for the FIREBRAND Missile acquisition
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Management is a term broadly applied to many seemingly
dissimilar occupations. The president of General Motors is a
manager; so is the individual wearing the red hat behind the
nearest McDonald's counter. While these two admittedly ex-
treme examples conjure up many differences, one thread of
commonality among managers is that they are all hired to get
some kind of job done. Joseph Massie calls managers,
... a group of people whose job it is to direct effort
toward common objectives through the activities of
other people. /\.S'.^J^-
The definition applies equally well to the chief executive of
a major corporation, the manager of a hamburger stand or a
manager in the Navy.
B. BASIC THESIS
This thesis examines the management function from the per-
spective of a Navy Weapons Acquisition Program Manager. The
basic thesis is that a key variable to success in major sys-
tems acquisition management is control. A project manager
must be continually aware and in control of the status of his
project. He is called upon to make significant decisions in
the process of fulfilling his basic mission. To be effective,
those decisions must be informed decisions.
Annotated references indicate the number of the item in
the reference list and the page quoted. For example, /15:47




Project management is a complex subject. The details of
designing , developing and producing a weapons system can be
very big business. Some acquisition projects are more modest
yet still very complex. The FIREBRAND Anti-Ship Missile Tar-
get (ASMT) acquisition project is a relatively small project
($41.7 million in development for six prototypes), yet large
enough (a six year development plan) to be described as a
responsible undertaking. Though relatively small in comparison
to other projects, FIREBRAND encompasses the entire range of
technical and business problems associated with systems acquisi-
tion management.
This thesis explores one of those areas of concern — that
of business management — from the perspective of establishing
a formalized management control system for the project. The
focus on business management is not intended to minimize the
technical development aspect which must be recognized as having
primary importance. A well budgeted project with tight cost
controls which produces a missile that will not fly can hardly





The first part of this thesis effort involved a study
of the management process with particular emphasis on control.
Chapter two makes a case for management control as a key func-
tion of managerial success. It is noted that control is ef-
fected through decisions made by the manager. The best
13

decisions are informed decisions. Chapter three explores the
concept of management information. Most of the literature in
this area is devoted to the development of large computer based
management information systems (MIS) . The scope of the FIRE-
BRAND project precludes the need for a major computer based
MIS. The ideas of computer MIS development are scaled down
from their computer orientation to distill the elements of a
good management control system. The conceptual study concludes
with an analysis of two theoretical frameworks. The classical
framework for planning and control systems developed by Robert
Anthony /~3_7 is described to highlight the perspective of the
acquisition program manager. A framework for information sys-
tems created by G. Anthony Gorry and Michael S. Scott-Morton
/T3/ by building on Anthony's model is examined to appreciate
the emphasis on decision making in MIS development. A brief
look at the Navy program manager and how he fits within these
two frameworks is followed by a summary description of three
control systems used in the Navy today.
2. Application
Within the concepts developed in chapters two, three
and four, the second half of the thesis effort proposes a
management control system for the FIREBRAND program manager.
Chapter five sets the perspective with a brief sketch of the
FIREBRAND project including organizational relationships, fund-
ing sources and a description of a few key reports. Chapter
six reports the efforts undertaken to develop the proposed
system and outlines that system. Based on the experience gained
14

in this thesis effort, chapter seven suggests a model pro-
cedure to follow for any future attempts at developing a
management control system in similar circumstances.
15

II. A CASE FOR MANAGEMENT CONTROL
A. PERSPECTIVE
1. The Challenge
* The challenge of the modern manager is control. The
successful manager produces results. In order to merit success,
particularly within the typically complex organizations of the
business world or the public sector, a manager must seize con-
trol of his organization in order to carry out his responsibil-
ities for "getting things done."
2. The Context of Control
* Control must be understood within the overall context
of the broad scope of the management function. As outlined by
Joseph L. Massie in his excellent summary of the essential
elements of management, there are seven distinct functions that








The manager is seen as a coordinator, an integrator of human
and material resources assembled to accomplish a specific
predetermined objective or task. In. this view, it is under-
standable that most authors see the management functions as
interrelated; however, it may be argued that some are more
important to the manager than others.
16

3. Planning and Control
^ Of the seven functions listed, two stand out as most
critical to managerial success — particularly in the public
sector. Planning and controlling are skills that a manager
must have if he is to have a productive impact on his organiza-
tion. The two are so closely linked that they might even be
thought of as a single function. After making the point that,
"Understanding and effective use of planning skills are crit-
ical to managerial success," /5:9_/, Douglas C. Basil notes that,
An integral part of the development of a plan is the
design of controls to ensure that the plan is being
carried out satisfactorily. Planning is but one of
the skills of the manager and serves little purpose
by itself . . . the plan itself is ineffectual if it
does not achieve the objective, and it is controls
that permit_the manager to know whether the plan is
doing so. /5:138_7-
It is not enough, though, for the manager merely to establish
controls. Peter Drucker makes a distinction between "controls"
and "control," noting that,
In the grammar of social institutions the word "controls"
is not the plural of the word "control." Not only do
more "controls" not necessarily give more "control" —
the two words in the context of social institutions have
different meanings altogether. The synonyms for "con-
trols" are measurement and information. The synonym
for "control" is direction. /10:286/
However, it may be argued that a successful manager must have
"controls" in order to be in "control" and able to provide
direction. An important aspect of control is feedback. In
order to provide proper direction, a manager must receive in-
formation on the progress of his organization toward the goals
established as part of the planning process. Ross Webber lists
five steps in the feedback control process /2"0:3147:
17

a. Communicating specific goals
b. Measuring actual performance
c. Reporting actual performance to appropriate people
d. Comparing actual performance with specific goals
e. Deciding to do nothing, to correct behavior, or to
modify goals.
4 . Example
The pre-eminence of planning and control in the hier-
archy of management functions is illustrated well by the exam-
ple of the typical Naval officer who is usually thrust into a
management role in which such elements as organization and
staffing are fairly well fixed. He must then turn to other
management functions in his efforts to produce results and be
successful. Unfortunately, from this author's viewpoint, most
Naval officers tend to concentrate their management efforts
on directing, with some attention to organization (usually re-
organization) , but with almost no attention to planning and
therefore fruitless efforts at control. The wise manager
understands and emphasizes planning and control.
B. MANAGEMENT CONTROL
1. Definition
Recognizing the link between planning and control, and
the essential nature of control as "direction" that is achieved
only through the selective application of controls, there is
one widely accepted definition of management control that meets
all of these criteria. In a frequently quoted reference,
Robert Anthony associates management control with the ongoing
administration of an enterprise and defines it as,
. . . the process by which managers assure that resources
are obtained and used effectively and ef f iciently_in the
accomplishment of an organization's objectives. /3 : 17//\
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Anthony is careful to make the point that his concept combines
both planning and control, but that the planning involved in
the management control process is distinct from that of strate-
gic planning which is carried out on a higher level. Anthony's
perception of management control will be examined in more de-
tail at a later point where the framework for control will be
established.
2. Underlying Concepts
While not immediately obvious from the definition,
there are several important concepts underlying and supporting
Anthony's definition of management control. First, since the
process involves managers, who are people who getf things done
by working with other people, there are important social ele-
ments that must be considered. The involvement of managers
implies the need for judgment. Second, the term effectiveness
implies getting to a specific desired end, within resource
and time constraints, which further implies the need for some
means of measurement to inform the manager when he has achieved
that end. Third, management control involves making decisions
about what to do in the future. Fourth, control is not to be
misunderstood as merely blind conformance to a plan where
achievement of the plan is the only concern; rather, it must
take cognizance also of the assumptions around which the plan
was developed and which may vary with time. And finally,
Anthony maintains that a management control system must have
an underlying financial structure since the dollar is the most
-common denominator for measurement.
19

3 . Limited use of the systems approach
Since Anthony's definition and framework form a con-
ceptual basis for this thesis effort, it is important to note
one of the limiting aspects of that framework. Many of today's
authors on the management process advocate a systems approach.
Cleland and King define this approach as follows:
The systems viewpoint is a perspective of the organization •
as a conglomerate of interrelated and interdependent parts
. . . the expression that "everything depends on everything




When dealing with management control, there is a danger in-
herent in attempting to apply the systems viewpoint. Anthony
makes the point in his framework that the actions and decisions
associated with management control are different from other
levels of the total management system. The danger of a total
systems approach is that this distinction will not be consid-
ered in a systems analyst's efforts to understand the problem
as a total, integrated, interdependent one. The fine point is
that excessive concern for the total system may miss the point
that the three activities of strategic planning, management
control and operational control of Anthony's model are dif-
ferent and, because of that, they have different information
requirements. In other words, the total systems approach may
distract the management control systems planner from establish-
ing a workable control system because of an overriding concern
to integrate all sub-elements into one giant system.
20

C. DECISION ORIENTATION ~
1. General
Running through almost every article and book on man-
agement control is the important link between control and
decision making. It is through the process of making decisions
that the manager implements his plans and responds to the feed-
back controls that signal deviations from those plans.
2. Decision Making Process
The classical process of rational decision making in-
volves six major steps.
a. Identify the problem or objective
b. Find alternative solutions or means of achieving
objectives
c. Analyze and compare alternatives
d. Select the alternative to be followed
e. Implement the selected alternative
f. Evaluate the decision
Of course there are variations of these six steps, but most
can be distilled down to these.
3. Types of Decisions
In establishing their own framework for management in-
formation systems, G. Anthony Gorry and Michael S. Scott-Morton
draw on the work of Herbert Simon to categorize decisions into
two major categories: structured and unstructured.
a. 'Structured Decisions
These are the kinds of decisions that are repetetive
and routine. Categorized by Simon as "programmed decisions,"
these are decisions made within the context of a "Definite pro-
cedure (that) has been worked out for handling them so they






These are decisions that are novel and consequen-
tial, for which "there is no cut and dried method of handling
the problem because it hasn't arisen before, or because its
precise nature and structure are elusive or complex ... "
/13:607 S £ CTlON,
4. Implications
It is clear that the two types of decisions described
above will require different treatment within the management
control process. In fact, within the terms defined by Anthony,
most structured (or programmed) decisions belong in the sphere
of operational control while unstructured decisions are charac-
teristic of those made on the management control level. There-
fore, a management control system should concentrate on support-
ing the manager making unstructured decisions.
5. Evaluation
An important element of management control is evalua-
tion. Once a control system has highlighted deviations from
the plan or presented other information to the manager, he
must make some sort of decision directed toward getting back
on course. This decision must be evaluated to assess whether
it was the right decision.
D . SUMMARY
1. Planning and Control
The challenge of the modern manager is control. If
planning is understood as the creation of objectives and
policies, then control may be seen as a process to ensure that
22

those plans are carried out as intended. Control is more than
merely establishing controls. The prudent manager recognizes
that controls are established within certain assumptions and
exercises care in assuring himself that those assumptions re-
main valid. Blind obedience to a plan does not ensure attain-
ment of goals.
2 . Management Control
A concept that links planning and control on the level
of the ongoing administration of an enterprise is management
control. This process implies a need for judgment by managers,
some means of measurement to inform the manager when he has
achieved his goal, and making decisions about the future.
There is only limited application of a total systems approach
to a management control system.
3 . Decision Orientation
The whole purpose for management control information
is to support decision making. Of the two major types of de-
cisions, it is the unstructured (or nonprogrammed) decision
that requires the support of the management control system.
Because of the novelty associated with unstructured decisions,
they must be evaluated continually
-
E. CONCLUSION
/The control function is the one element of management that
a manager must call on first before he can be very effective.
It is almost ludicrous to envision a manager making decisions
or giving directions without first having sufficient control
to know what is going on in his organization. The key to
23

effective control is information. The next chapter discusses




III. THE CONCEPT OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
A. INFORMATION AND CONTROL
One of the most important elements of management control
is information. It has been observed that, "information is
power." The individual who possesses the most up to date,
most accurate information is likely to be the one who wields
the most power. Further, having timely, accurate information
is a vital key to the success of a manager, whose job is one
of planning, control and direction. A manager provides direc-
tion by making decisions. In today's complex highly integrated
environment those decisions can have an impact even beyond his
own organization. One of the limiting factors in a manager's
decision making process is the information he receives. In-
accurate information, or even accurate information received
too late can lead to bad decisions.
Because information is so important to decision making
which, in turn, is critical to a manager's ability to control,
it must be correctly and systematically processed. This pro-
cessing is usually carried on in what has become known as a
Management Information System. Since control is the key
management function being dealt with in this study, the term
"Management Control System" will be understood to be synono-
mous and interchangeable with "Management Information System.
"
B. WHAT A MIS IS NOT
Before getting into a conceptual understanding of what a
Management Information System is, it is important to clarify
25

what it is not. First, a management information system need
not be computerized.
Too often the term "information system" automatically
brings to mind extensive computer systems, but there
is nothing in the philosophy of an information system
that requires computer processing. /9 : 2 0/
Second, a management information system is not the "final
solution." No information system, computerized or not, will
ever replace the ultimate need for human decision making.
Third, a management information system is not a static thing
which, once put in place, will not change for some time.
Fourth, a management information system does not guarantee
that proper decisions will be made — even though the system
may be a computerized program that is actually "making" re-
petetive decisions. And finally, a management information
system is not foolproof. As with many systems, MIS requires
input and review by human beings who have proven in the past




In attempting to understand what a Management Information
System is, it is important to know what "information" means.
The classic distinction is made between data and information.
Whereas data is any collection of raw facts, information is
the result of data that has been acted upon in some way (pro-
cessed) to be transformed into some more meaningful form. In-
formation clarifies; i.e.,
The primary function of information ... is to increase




Information has value. It has been illustrated using
operations analysis techniques that the expected value of a
decision process is enhanced by the addition of information;
i.e., the worth of information can be quantified as the dif-
ference between the expected value of an outcome with informa-
tion and the value without information.
Information is time sensitive. As information ages it's
usefulness is degraded. When it gets old enough we think of
it less as "information" and more as "historical data," which
seems to imply a sort of regression back to the raw, less
relevant state from which it came.
Information has broad impact. It can be put to many uses;




4. Aid decision making




7 Gain competetive advantage
8. Confuse and mislead others
Information is important. The importance of information to
management cannot be underestimated. James O'Brien highlights
this importance with the point that,
Each of the management functions requires the analysis
and synthesis of information before a specific decision
can be made. /17:26 3_7











D. A DEFINITION OF MIS
There are as many definitions of Management Information
Systems as there are authors writing in the field. Most make
a point of noting that there is no concise way of defining a
MIS; however, within the context of this study, one definition
seems to capture the essence of what is required in a good
Management Control System. In an article on areas to investi-
gate for a better MIS, Robert W. Holmes uses a definition put
forth by the Management Information Systems Committee of the
Financial Executives' Institute, which states in part that,
MIS is a system designed to provide selected decision
oriented information needed by management to plan, con-
trol and evaluate the activities of a corporation. /14 : 24_7
Replacing "a corporation" with "an organization" lends some
more universal application to this excellent definition.
1. Decision-Orientation
The first key element in this definition is the orienta-
tion of a MIS toward decisions. Since the way that a manager
effects control and direction in his organization is through
decision making, information is most useful to that manager
when it has a bearing on decisions he must make. In an article
for a conference on the subject, Steven Alter coins the phrase
"Decision Support System," calling it a "buzzword whose time
has arrived," /2:397 emphasizing the linkage between MIS and
decisions.
The dedication of a MIS to support decision making is
important enough to cause consideration of designing the MIS
according to the nature of the decision making process it
supports. Gordon B. Davis suggests that,
28

The MIS should be designed to monitor programmed decisions
and to identify those for which the decision rules do not
seem applicable . . . Nonprogrammed decisions are generally
unstructured. For these, the MIS provides, where possible,
a set of tools by which the decision maker can structure
the decision-making process. /8:146_7
2. Filtration and Condensation
A second key element in the definition offered above
is that the MIS provides "selected ... information." In view
of the large volume of information and the complexity of most
business operations, an information system is only useful to
the extent that it can condense and filter raw data and extra-
neous information into a distilled essence that will be rele-
vant to the decision it seeks to support. Or, as it is put by
Russell Ackoff,
Unless the information overload to which managers are
subjected is reduced, any additional information made
available by a_MIS cannot be expected to be used
effectively. /1:B148_7
However, as Alfred Rappaport points out in his counterpoint to
Ackoff 's article, there is an inherent danger in condensation
and filtration,
. . . indiscriminate filtration and "overcondensation"
can ... lead to non-salutary results. /18:B134/
The basic caution raised by Rappaport is that the filtration
process must not be relegated to a low level of the organiza-
tion which may lack the perspective required to make good
filtration decisions. The proper measure of selectivity is
very important to a good MIS since miscalculation in either
direction has serious negative effects.
29

3. Use in Planning, Controlling and Evaluating
The final key element of the definition to be discussed
here is the ultimate use of the information processed through a
MIS. The information is intended for use by management in plan-
ning, controlling and evaluating the organization. It is im-
portant to realize that while these three management functions
tend to merge one into the other in a sort of continuum, they
are quite often performed on different levels of the organiza-
tion. Since they function on different levels, they require
different types of information.
E. OTHER INFLUENCES AND CONSIDERATIONS
Besides the concerns raised in an analysis of the defini-
tion, there are other elements of the business environment that
impact on a MIS and which should be considered in a complete
understanding of the MIS concept.
1. Style of the Manager
The personal operating style of the manager for whom
the MIS is intended can be important to its design and utility.
A manager who is "quantitatively oriented" may desire much
more analytical information that one who is not. A manager
who permits a great deal of decentralized decision making may
require very little management information (or perhaps quite




Nature of Data Base
The volume and complexity of the information available
within the organization and the degree to which it must be






Close coordination with the ultimate user of the MIS
output is critical to success of a MIS. A manager who does
not understand or care about the product he gets makes a MIS
nothing more than a bad reason to employ more people.
4 Existing Facilities and Flows
No management information system is a brand new crea-
tion. Usually a MIS starts out as nothing more than the for-
malization of already existing informal information systems.
It should be recognized that not all of the informal system
will (or should) be included in the formalized MIS. Cognizance
must be taken of existing EDP facilities and their use employed
to the maximum extent possible before embarking on potentially
unnecessary investment in computer hardware and software.
5. Security
The need for security of information both within the
organization and external to it must receive attention when
deciding what information to include. When information is
included in the formal system it tends to become more avail-
able to more people.
6. Cost
Any MIS must prove itself to be cost effective. There
is no point in gathering information intended to effect sav-
ings in an organization if the cost of gathering the informa-
tion exceeds the savings that can be realized. The cost/-




F. ELEMENTS OF A GOOD MIS
The measure of a good MIS is difficult to achieve on a
conceptual level. What seems reasonable on paper may fail
miserably in practice. Certain qualities, though, tend to be
repeated throughout the literature and should at least be
considered in developing or improving a MIS. These elements
are:
1. Timeliness and accuracy of information
2. Decision orientation




5. Top management support
6. User involvement
7. Maximum use of existing facilities
8. Flexibility in design
9. Security
10. Cost effectiveness
Most of these elements have been addressed previously and are
presented here by way of summary. One element not previously
stressed but deserving of comment is the need for top manage-
ment support of the MIS. If the boss only pays lip service to
the MIS, his subordinate managers are going to have little
interest in using it themselves and no concern over what it
says about their own performance. If, on the other hand, sub-
ordinate evaluations are based in part on demonstrated perform-
ance through MIS indicators, then the MIS can be a powerful
management control device. Another is flexibility in design.
An effective MIS must be readily adaptable to accommodate




"Information is power." In order for a manager to carry
out his responsibilities of planning, control and direction he
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must receive accurate and timely information on which to base
his decisions. A management information system is developed
to do this. A MIS is no panacea and by its mere existence
does not guarantee that good decisions will be made; however,
without an effective MIS, a manager will make good decisions
largely by intuition and by accident rather than on an in-
formed rational basis.
The primary function of information is to reduce uncer-
tainty. Information has been shown to add value to decisions.
Information is important to the process of management decision
making and control. To be most valuable to management, infor-
mation must be: relevant, available, timely, objective, sensi-
tive, comparable and of high quality.
A management information system (MIS) provides selected
decision-oriented information needed by management in planning
and controlling an organization. As such, a MIS may be seen
as synonomous with a management control system (MCS) . A good
MIS exists in recognition of the environment within which it
operates. It must be responsive to the management that it
serves as well as the user who must interface with it on a
daily basis. It must be flexible. A good MIS/MCS reports
exception information to management in an easy to use format.
And finally, a worthwhile MIS justifies the cost of implement-
ing and maintaining it.
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IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR CONTROL IN WEAPONS ACQUISITION
A. TWO THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Allusion has been made in previous chapters to a framework
for control designed by Robert Anthony and a framework for
management information systems developed by G. Anthony Gorry
and Michael S. Scott-Morton. A more complete understanding of
these frameworks is important to the design of a management
control system for weapons acquisition.
1. Anthony Framework
In his seminal work, Planning and Control Systems: A
Framework for Analysis , Robert N. Anthony sets forth "a frame-
work (intended to) influence the conduct of future research in
the broad topic of planning and control systems." /3~:V7"
Anthony postulates that there are three distinct levels of
planning and control efforts within organizations. They are
Strategic Planning, Management Control and Operational Control.
a. Strategic Planning
The highest level of planning in the total frame-
work, " ... strategic planning is the process of deciding on
objectives of the organization, on changes in these objectives,
on the resources used to attain these objectives, and on the
policies that are to govern the acquisition, use and disposition
of these resources." /3 : 16/y Strategic planning connotes big
plans with major consequences; the development of policies that
change the character or direction of the organization. Strate-
gic planning decisions affect the physical, financial, and
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organizational framework within which the operations are car-
ried on. The process is often complex with a broad range of
social and political factors (as well as economic concerns)
having a bearing. It is essentially irregular in that each
problem is sufficiently different from other problems so that
each must be approached differently. Strategic planning re-
sults in policies and precedents for the organization.
b. Management Control
This second level is defined by Anthony as, " ...
the process by which managers assure that resources are ob-
tained and used effectively and efficiently in the accomplish-
ment of the organization's objectives." /3 : 17/ Management
control is a process carried on within the guidelines estab-
lished by strategic planning, intended to make possible the
achievement of planned objectives within the guidelines. It
encompasses both planning and control; although, the planning
done on this level is more oriented toward current operations
than strategic planning. Management control has an underlying
financial structure. The end result of management control is
the initiation of action within policies and precedents estab-
lished in strategic planning.
c. Operational Control
This final level, " ... is the process of assuring
that specific tasks are carried out effectively and efficiently."
/3 : 177^ Operational control is concerned with tasks; little
or no judgment is required as to what is to be done. It focuses
on execution with little planning effort. Effective operational
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control results in smooth day-to-day functioning of the
organization.
d. Illustration
Anthony offers a model of this process, several


















The model fails to illustrate (but Anthony emphasizes in the
text) the interrelationships between the various levels. Some
of the Strategic Planning effort is indistinct from Management
Planning which merges into Operational Control; however, the
three are distinct enough to be seen as unique entities,
e. Information
A key element of the framework is Anthony's under-
standing of the information required on each level. Because
of their different orientations, each level requires different
kinds of information to support the various decisions made on
each level. The unstructured, irregular nature of strategic
planning dictates information that will be unique to the dif-
ferent problems addressed. Information will be generally
36

external and predictive in nature, but far less accurate than
that required on the other levels. In contrast, the informa-
tion required to support management control is likely to be
highly integrated, more internal and historical, and more
accurate than the requirements for strategic planning. In a
logical progression, the information required on the operational
control level is characterized as tailormade to the operation,
often non-financial, precise and frequently real time.
2. Gorry — Scott-Morton Framework
a. A Framework for MIS
In an article for Sloan Management Review /137#
G. Anthony Gorry and Michael S. Scott-Morton update and refine
Anthony ' s general framework within the context of management
information systems. These authors highlight the differences
in information requirements, ultimately offering the opinion
that,
... it rarely makes sense to couple managers in the man-
agement control and strategic planning areas directly
with the masses of detailed data required for operational
control. /13:59/
To develop their own framework for information
systems
, Gorry and Scott-Morton synthesize the concepts of
Herbert Simon with the framework of Anthony. Essentially,
these authors take Simon's definitions of programmed and un-
programmed decisions (call them structured and unstructured
to minimize the aspect of computer dependence in order to focus
instead on the decision qualities) and merge them with Anthony's


















































Once they have coneptualized their framework, the
authors go on to discuss decision making within the framework,
The main points made are that:
(1) The areas of greatest concern to managers are
in the lower half of the matrix where largely unstructured
decisions are made.
(2) Information systems ought to be centered
around the important decisions of the organization, many of
which are largely unstructured which requires developing and
formulating decision models.
(3) Most managers do not have great information
needs; rather they have need of new methods to understand and
process the information already available to them.
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(4) The focus of attention should be on the critical
decisions in an organization and on explicit modeling of those
decisions prior to the design of information systems support,
c. Implications of the Framework
The authors summarize three implications their
framework has on designing a MIS.
(1) The "totally-integrated-management-information-
systems" ideas so popular in the literature are a poor design
concept. It is better to consider the differences in the var-
ious areas of decision making (strategic planning, management
control and operational control) and design information systems
that are responsive to each area's unique information require-
ments .
(2) The training, background and style of decision
making of managers in the three areas are often different.
This means that the types of models to be used and the method
of elucidating these from the managers will be different.
(3) The method of developing models will be dif-
ferent for each area because the nature of the decisions are
different.
B. THE PROGRAM MANAGER AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL
1. The Matrix Organization
The Weapons Acquisition Program Manager in the Navy
frequently is organized according to the principles of a matrix
organization. This type of organization is characterized by a
small staff assigned directly to the program manager who is
charged with a specific task that is usually limited in scope
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and which crosses the functional bounds of the organization.
The program manager obtains support from the functional depart-


















This type of organization creates unique problems for the pro-
ject manager. Because much of his support is not directly
subordinate to him he must exercise a great degree of tact and
diplomacy in obtaining resources necessary for support.
2 . Management Control
It is clear from his relative position in the Navy
organization that the acquisition program manager operates
principally at Anthony's management control level in the frame-
work for Planning and Control. The program manager is given a
specific task, usually to develop and procure a new weapons
system or develop alternative concepts. Though he is concerned
with a planning horizon that extends over a period of five to
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eight years (longer for larger projects) , the program manager
is not involved in strategic planning. The big plans with major
consequences are made on much higher levels in the Navy, the
Department of Defense and the Office of the President.
While the program manager does not operate on the stra-
tegic planning level, neither is he on the other extreme squarely
in the operational control area. The task of the program man-
ager is not so well defined as to preclude the need for subjec-
tive judgment. The tasks are not so routine as to require only
efficient execution and no planning.
Within the understanding that the areas in Anthony's
framework are not so rigidly defined as to have distinct
boundaries, the acquisition program manager spans the defini-
tion of management control, with perhaps some extension into
operational control depending on the status of the project.
A program manager assigned to a project in its earliest phases
is probably closer to the strategic planning end of management
control than to operational control. As the project progresses
through research and development and toward better definition
and ultimately to the production phase, the program manager
should mature as well toward the edge of the management control
area that merges into operational control. A comparison of
this parallel between the Weapons Acquisition process and
Anthony's framework is illustrated in figure 4-3.
3. Decision Orientation
Recognizing that the acquisition project manager fits
best into Anthony's framework within his definition of manage-
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of the decisions that fall to the project manager. Referring
to the Gorry/Scott-Morton framework for MIS (Table 4-1) , it







Those decisions of greatest concern to the project manager
should be expected to be of the unstructured nature where it
is not possible to automate the solutions. A management in-
formation system that will be most useful in this context is
one that provides information to the program manager in order
that he may apply his experience and judgment in ultimately
making the best decision.
4 . Further Detail
The role of the program manager in weapons acquisition
has been treated here only very lightly. For readers interested
in a more in depth treatment of the acquisition process in gen-
eral, and the program manager in particular, Arming America :
How the U.S. Buys Weapons by J. Ronald Fox /Tl7 is highly
recommended.
C. AVAILABLE CONTROL SYSTEMS
In recognition of the need for control throughout the
Department of Defense, particularly in the weapons acquisition
area, DOD has adopted several systems to attain this control.
Three that are of particular importance to the acquisition
program manager will be outlined here. They are: (1) Planning,
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Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) , (2) Network tech-
niques; e.g., Critical Path Method (CPM) and Program Evaluation
and Review Technique (PERT) , and (3) Cost/Schedule Control
System (C/SCS)
.
1. Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPBS)
The DOD PPBS is a highly structured system designed to
develop a budget that will be responsive to the strategic plan-
ning needs of the Department of Defense. As summarized in the
General Dynamics publication Fiscal and Life Cycles of Defense
Systems
,
Based on the anticipated THREAT a STRATEGY is developed.
In support of that strategy, force REQUIREMENTS are de-
veloped. Based on these requirements, PROGRAMS are de-
veloped to provide, on an orderly basis, ships, aircraft,
weapons systems and manpower over a period of time, with
due consideration of the total cost to the nation. Last-
ly, funds must be BUDGETED in such a manner as to obtain
the required forces and weapons systems within the re-
sources that the nation provides. /12:12_7
Most of the effort in the PPBS takes place on the higher levels
of the Executive Branch and Congress. The military departments
(and consequently the program managers) get actively involved
in the budgeting phase of the cycle which is partially illus-
trated below /12:l7.
The significance to the program manager in his efforts
at management control is that the PPBS is a highly structured
process that requires input at very inflexible times. In order
to ensure that his program is supported in the budget cycle,
the program manager must be responsive to the requirements of
the PPBS with strong justification for the funds required for
his program. More detailed understanding of PPBS may be found
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2. Networks : CPM/PERT
While not exclusively a DOD instrument of control, net-
works play a significant role in weapons acquisition. A net-
work is essentially nothing more than a method of describing
a series of interdependent activities, the accomplishment of
which are necessary for the successful completion of a project
Critical Path Method (CPM) and Program Evaluation and
Review Technique (PERT) Networks are simply two variations on
the basic network concept. CPM introduces time and cost fac-
tors which are weighed to determine that path of activities
in the network which are most critical to the accomplishment
of the project. PERT is essentially a variation of CPM where
time factors are not known with certainty and therefore must
be estimated with probabilities assigned to the various
estimates. 45

Networks can be important to the program manager who
is responsible for development of a complex weapons system that
depends on several parallel and complex component developments.
3. Cost/Schedule Control System (C/SCS)
The DOD C/SCS is a system designed to measure and con-
trol cost, schedule and technical performance of contractors
in the weapons acquisition process. The intent is to require
all contractors to report this information in a common manner
so that it can be aggregated into reports at high summary levels
within DOD. There are five criteria specified in DOD Instruc-
tion 7000.2. They are (1) Organization, (2) Planning and
Budgeting, (3) Accounting, (4) Analysis and (5) Revisions.
Basically, the contractor is required to build a cost collec-
tion and control system around the Work Breakdown Structure
(WBS) of the system under contract. When this is done in a
manner consistent with the criteria in DOD Instruction 7000.2,
the contractor submits reports in accordance with DOD Instruc-
tion 7000.10. These reports allow government contract admin-
istrators (and program managers) to pinpoint variances from
plans to specific elements of the WBS and to assess quickly
whether they have cost and/or schedule implications. Since
this system is so important to management control of a weapons
acquisition project, a more expanded summary of its important
elements is provided in Appendix A.
D . SUMMARY
Chapters two, three and four have established the concep-
tual framework within which a control system for weapons
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acquisition should be developed. A case has been made for
planning and control as two of the most important functions
of management. Robert Anthony's definition of management
control has been accepted as the most precise statement of
how planning and control should be understood in the acquisi-
tion context. It has been noted that the whole purpose for
management control is to support decision making. An under-
standing of the importance of information and an appreciation
for the conceptual development of a good Management Informa-
tion System have been developed. As a preface to the practical
evolution of a management control system, two prominent theo-
retical frameworks have been explored and three existing con-
trol systems have been briefly described.
The remainder of this thesis effort is aimed at applying
the concepts outlined to this point to the specific case of
the FIREBRAND Anti-Ship Missile acquisition project. The next
chapter briefly describes the project and its organizational
relationships. Following that is a description of the control
system proposed for FIREBRAND. Chapter seven describes the
process undertaken in this effort in terms general enough so
that it may be applied to establishing a control system in
some other similar management situation. The final chapter




V. THE FIREBRAND PROJECT
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command established the mis-
sion of the FIREBRAND Anti-Ship Missile Target (ASMT) Project
(APC-6) as follows:
The Project Coordinator's primary mission is to provide a
fully developed, supported and reliable aerial target sys-
tem which replicates the threat, at reasonable cost and
on a timely basis, to commanders responsible for test and
evaluation of Navy Anti-Ship Missile Defense Weapons
Systems. (NAVAIRINST 5400. 9D)
On May 4, 1977 a cost plus incentive fee contract was signed
with Teledyne Industries, Inc. (Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical
Division) calling for the design and development of the ZBQM-
111A target system in accordance with government specifications
provided, at a total cost of $41,713,920 which would be funded
incrementally over six years.
The FIREBRAND ASMT System is intended to replicate enemy
anti-ship missile threat parameters and provide a target for
test and evaluation of U.S. defense systems throughout the
1980' s. In order to do that, the missile system must be ca-
pable of approaching its target from a variety of dive angles
to an ultimate low-level supersonic terminal dash. The target
employs a simple cylindrical fuselage design with low cost,
pylon mounted ram jet engines. See Figure 5-1. FIREBRAND
will carry avionics to permit guidance and control including
an on-board computer for anti-ship missile peculiar maneuvers
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designed to be either ground launched or air launched with a
modified Patriot booster rocket to carry it to initial cruise
altitude.
An important concept in the design plan for FIREBRAND is
the dedication to developing the system at minimum cost. To
this end, maximum use is to be made of existing systems and
off the shelf components. Using the booster from the Army/
Raytheon XMIM-104 Patriot surface to air missile (with minor
modification), and the Navy's Control Data AN/AYK-14 flight
control computer are just two examples of this principle em-
ployed on the project. To further reduce mission costs, the
system is designed to be recoverable and reusable. Further
specifics of the system are described in an article recently
published in Aviation Week and Space Technology of 27 Feb-
ruary 78. /197
B. ORGANIZATION
The FIREBRAND Project Office (APC-6) is a part of the
Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters organization. The
small project staff works in a typical project management
environment, the essence of which is depicted in Figures 5-2
and 5-3. The relationships that impact on the FIREBRAND
Project Office may be grouped into three general categories:
(1) Activities external to and senior to COMNAVAIRSYSCOM
(2) Navy organizations internal to or primarily subor-
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In the first category of activities senior to COMNAVAIR,
most of the relationships involve policy, funding or reports.
The relationships with OPNAV are the ones most frequently en-
countered. It is interesting to note the closed loop that
starts with Congress appropriating funds for the project.
These funds ultimately get down to the Project Office, pri-
marily through OP-098. The loop is closed by the Project
Office submitting the periodic System Acquisition Report (SAR)
to Congress. (Refer to Figure 5-2)
The second major category of interrelationships is the sup-
port received by the Program Manager from various elements of
NAVAIR through the matrix organization concept. For example,
AIR-02 provides a Contracting Officer and all normal contract-
ing services. AIR-08 provides budget guidance and funding.
In the future, AIR-04 will play an intimate role in logistical
support planning. Most of the support, though, comes from ex-
ternal activities. Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC) , Point
Mugu, is the primary test and evaluation facility which is also
responsible for integrating much of the payload equipment.
Naval Weapons Center (NWC) , China Lake, is the technical moni-
tor for propulsion systems, and as such, has a lot of inter-
face with subcontractors Marquard and Thiokol. Naval Surface
Weapons Center (NSWC) , Dahlgren, is responsible for safety and
will become more involved as the project draws closer to
production. Naval Air Development Center (NADC) , Warminster,
is the lead laboratory responsible to oversee structural de-
sign, aerodynamics, avionics, electrical systems, etc. Naval
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Avionics Center (NAC) , Indianapolis, is responsible for com-
puter support. (See Figure 5-3)
The last major category is the normal contractual relation-
ship between the Project Office and the prime contractor.
While there is no direct contractual relationship between the
Project Manager and subcontractors, there is still active
dialogue between Project Office personnel and subcontractor
employees. As a measure of control, the Project Manager re-
ceives reports from the contractor.
C. FUNDING
1. Sources
The project office receives funds through normal
channels. Funds are appropriated under project #W0611 (Anti-
Ship Missile Targets) and program element #64258 (Aerial Tar-
get Systems Development) . Apportionment of funds proceeds
from the Congressional authorization through the office of the
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) , the Navy Comptroller,
Naval Material Command and ultimately to Naval Air Systems
Command Comptroller (AIR-0 8) from whom the project office re-
ceives authorization to obligate. Perhaps more important than
this formal funding structure is the informal liaison between
the project office and its OPNAV sponsors. In parallel with
the formalized budget submission process is an informal di-
alogue that exists between the project office and OPNAV (OP-05
and OP-098) . As tradeoffs are being made at the CNO/DOD level,
these mission and funding sponsors require support from the
project office. It is necessary for the program manager to
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be able to respond quickly (often within only a matter of
hours) as to the impact on his project of changes in funding
levels or time constraints.
2. Authorizations
The program manager obtains assistance from NAVAIR sub-
ordinates and field activities by tasking them with an AIRTASK
and funding them through use of a work request. It is impor-
tant to the program manager to ensure that funds authorized
through this process are utilized for their intended purpose
and are obligated at a rate consistent with full obligation by
the end of the fiscal year.
D . REPORTS
The project office receives reports from subordinate activ-
ities and is required, in turn, to report periodically to higher
authority. Some of the more significant reports are discussed
here.
1. Examples of Incoming Reports
Most of the incoming reports are received from the con-
tractor as dictated by the Contract Data Requirements List of
the basic contract. Some of the reports important to manage-
ment control are described briefly here.
a. Hot Line Report
This is a formalized requirement for the contractor
to report by telephone as required to the program manager, any
significant problems with the contract.
b. Letter Progress Report
This is a monthly report of the progress made dur-
ing the previous month. It is a narrative of what has been
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done by the contractor (or other submitter) during the report
period, highlighting problems encountered and plans for the
immediate future.
c. Progress/Status Meeting Report
This report is a summary of the results of each
formal program review conducted by the project office.
d. Cost Performance Report
This is a monthly report of cost and schedule data
submitted in accordance with the DOD Cost/Schedule System dis-
cussed in Appendix A.
2. Outgoing Reports
In order to keep more senior levels of management ap-
prised of the progress of the development, periodic reports
are required.
a. NAVAIR Management Information Center Report
Periodically (usually semi-annually) the program
manager presents a report of the overall progress of the pro-
ject to COMNAVAIRSYSCOM and directors of the divisions within
NAVAIR headquarters. This report encompasses technical de-
velopment progress, funding profile, an overall assessment of
the program and areas of future risk.
b. NAVMAT Quarterly Project Status Report
This report details the status of the project from
the standpoint of schedule, technical, financial and resources
over the current fiscal year and projected forward for three
fiscal years. The program manager must make a judgment as to
whether each of these categories is to be rated as satisfac-
tory (green) , marginal (yellow) or unsatisfactory (red) and be
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prepared to defend that judgment with facts.
c. NAVAIR Obligation/Expenditure Report
This report is made quarterly to the NAVAIR Comp-
troller (AIR-08) and reports obligations and expenditures to
date for the project.
Of course these are not the only reports received by
or required of the program manager, but are described here to
provide some insight into a few typical report requirements
placed on the project office.
E . SUMMARY
The FIREBRAND Project Manager is tasked with developing
and producing an anti-ship missile target intended for testing
U.S. defenses against enemy anti-ship cruise missiles. The
project presently is well into the developmental stage of the
weapons acquisition process. The project office operates
within a matrix organization. Though funding patterns are not
unique, the informal dialogue appears more important to success
than the formal budget structure. To maintain control of the
project, the program manager receives regular reports from
contractors and field activities. In turn, he must report
periodically to higher management. In order to maintain
management control and make required reports, the program
manager must be aware of what is happening on his project. A
formalized management control system can help organize the
large volume of data into a more meaningful format to provide




VI. A MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM FOR FIREBRAND
A. SCOPE
The FIREBRAND Project Manager needs a formalized system to
keep himself informed as to the progress of his program toward
fulfilling the mission requirement, to, "provide a fully de-
veloped, supported and reliable aerial target, at reasonable
cost and on a timely basis ..." (NAVAIRINST 5400. 9D of 15 June
77) . From this brief statement, it is clear that the manager
must be concerned with performance (reliability) , cost and
schedule during development and production of the weapons
system. In order to ensure that required levels of perform-
ance are achieved within a scheduled time frame and at or below
a previously budgeted cost, the program manager must plan his
project, develop a schedule and then control the progress to
see that desired goals are met. At the time of this effort,
a FIREBRAND program master plan had been established, a de-
tailed development schedule existed and informal controls were
present. This chapter reports the efforts undertaken to de-
velop a system of formal tools designed to enhance the control
effort.
B . OVERVIEW
The total management control system should be designed to
provide rapid adequate communication of information to the
program manager, usable for taking action in making decisions
necessary to guide the project to successful completion. In
preparing this proposal, the first step was to identify and
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classify the decisions required to be made. Next, it was
necessary to determine what information was required and then
whether that information was available. Finally, the informa-
tion to be reported was arranged in a format most efficient
for the decision maker.
C. DECISION ANALYSIS
1. General Nature of Decisions
Having recognized that the FIREBRAND project is well
into the development stage of the weapons acquisition cycle
and therefore squarely in the Management Control area of Robert
Anthony's framework (see figure 4-3), it may be concluded that
the nature of the decisions to be made by the FIREBRAND program
manager are largely unstructured. This quality implies a large
degree of unpredictability in terms of the exact type and tim-
ing of many of these decisions. The most important decisions
are likely to be problem derived; i.e., required only because
some problem (whether anticipated or not) has arisen. This
whole orientation toward problems that are generally not pre-
dicted makes it mandatory that the information being provided
to the manager present as many alternatives and as much flex-
ibility as is practical to obtain. For example, in order to
be responsive to the informal budget process described in
chapter five, the program manager must know precisely where
his project stands (both in terms of cost and schedule) so that
he can report the impact of changes conjectured by OPNAV
sponsors in their efforts to make tradeoffs.
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(2 . Basic Structure
The decisions required of the FIREBRAND program man-
ager were identified as falling within two major categories.
a. Technical Decisions
The development of a major weapons system requires
a considerable number of complex technical decisions. These
decisions include such engineering concerns as, for example,
the aerodynamic qualities of the design, the choice of pro-
pulsion systems, control of the weight of the missile to re-
main within fuel capabilities while still performing the re-
quired mission, etc. While some initial effort was undertaken
in this area, time limitations and the lack of sufficient
engineering expertise on the part of the author limited any
substantial results.
b. Business Decisions
In close parallel with the technical development
of the weapons system, there are significant business oriented
decisions which must be made in order to fulfill the mission.
These business concerns include such elements as budgeting,
contracting and financial control. It was within this area
that the efforts of this project were concentrated.
3. Master Plan
The basic building block of the management control
system is a master plan that includes: (1) a Master Engineer-
ing Development Plan, (2) a Master Budget Plan and (3) a Master
Contracting Plan. The master plan is intended to be reviewed
at least monthly by the project manager based on information
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provided by project office staff members, subordinate field
activities and the contractor. The format must consider the
progress of each major element against past performance and
projecting to the future. The monthly letter progress report,
the cost performance report and information from the DOD PPBS
system are major sources of information for updating the master
plan.
a. Master Engineering Development Plan
This plan is a summary of the progress of the tech-
nical development of the weapons system. The plan is aligned
to the Work Breakdown Structure. A dependency network outlin-
ing the major program development milestones (e.g., Preliminary
Design Review, Critical Design Review, Preflight Program Re-
view, etc.) and the major intermediate steps on which these
critical milestones depend is the base upon which the plan is
built. Such a network identifying the planned start and com-
pletion dates and the activity responsible for each intermed-
iate task has been developed for FIREBRAND by Systems Con-
sultants Inc. To be useful as a management control device,
this network must be expanded with greater detail of steps
which must be accomplished (and decisions which must be made)
in the completion of the task; then, on a periodic basis
(monthly) the project manager must be informed as to whether
the steps are on schedule. When schedule slippage is observed,
the effect on other tasks must be clear. Alternatives should
be presented which consider cost impact, in order for the pro-
ject manager to render a decision.
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It is anticipated that significant problems will
arise that must be communicated to the project manager for a
decision outside the normal course of the regular monthly re-
view of the Master Engineering Plan. These problems may arise
out of program reviews, informal information from the contractor
(hot line reports), failure reports, test and evaluation reports,
or engineering change proposals. While this input must be used
to update the Master Engineering Plan on a routine basis, it
must also be transmitted to the project manager for any action/
decision that may be required,
b. Master Budget Plan
The Budget Plan has been developed according to the
demands of the DOD Planning Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS) which establishes specific and inflexible requirements
for input by DOD components and the informal requirements of
OPNAV sponsors. The budget plan includes a budget formulation
element and a budget execution element. Budget formulation
encompasses the effort involved in preparing, presenting and
defending the project's portion of the federal budget. The
process is highly structured and must be responsive to exter-
nal forces; e.g., OSD, NAVMAT, NAVAIR which are described in
DODINST 7045.7. The primary question to be addressed in budget
formulation is whether sufficient funds are requested to meet
the required schedule and reliability goals. The funding re-
quirement must be supported by hard requirements that must be
able to withstand critical analysis at all levels up through
OSD review; therefore, the justification for requested funding
levels must be solid.
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Budget execution includes procedures employed sub-
sequent to budget submission and approval. In order to maintain
budget formulation credibility it is imperative that funds au-
thorized be obligated at a rate consistent with full obligation
by the end of the fiscal year and in accordance with the intent
for which funds were authorized. The budget execution plan is
developed for each fiscal year as funds are authorized. A
separate plan is established for each activity receiving fund-
ing through the project office. Monthly reports of obligations
are received and reviewed.
c. Master Contracting Plan
A Contract Management Plan is that portion of the
master plan that concentrates on preparation and administration
of contracts or other instruments of agreement (in the case of
subordinate NAVAIR activities) . In the case of new contracts/
agreements in the negotiation process, the project manager must
be kept informed of the progress of any negotiations until the
ultimate agreement and signing of the contract. The plan is
also concerned with Contract Administration which involves the
complex area of ensuring that the contractor meets the terms
of the contract. The program manager requires reports on the
major areas of financial and cost control, performance stand-
ards and schedule. A particularly important element of contract
administration is the maintenance of close control over engi-
neering changes. A number of minor concerns must also receive




4 . Business Decision Elements
Within the Master Budget Plan and the Master Contract-
ing Plan which are the two elements of the Master Plan that
fall under the general category of business decisions, there
are several important sub-elements under which specific deci-
sion questions may be enumerated. These elements are: (1)
Budget Formualtion, (2) Budget Execution, (3) Procurement and
Contract Administration, (4) Financial Control and a general
category of (5) Project Administration. Each of these sub-
elements and examples of the decisions required is discussed
in the following subparagraphs.
a. Budget Formulation
This element involves the very structured process
of developing, submitting and defending budget estimates within
the DOD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
.
The timing of PPBS budget submissions is usually determined by
external forces; e.g., OSD, NAVMAT, NAVAIR. The process of
developing budget estimates must recognize these submission
time frames and be scheduled accordingly. DOD Instruction
7045.7 prescribes actions required during the calendar year
with respect to the PPBS system. Decisions which are required
of the program manager with regard to formulating a budget
within the guidelines of this system are:
(1) Do the policies expressed in Presidential, OSD
and Navy guidance documents have any direct effect on this
project? What accommodations are required?
(2) Are the resources proposed sufficient to accom-
plish the goals of the project?
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(3) Is the justification of the budget submission
substantial enough to ensure that required funds will be
authorized?
(4) What position/input is required for testimony
to Congress?
(5) Are there budget related decisions being made
on other programs which may impact on this project; e.g., can-
cellations or accelerations of other programs that could affect
funds available within RD&E accounts?
(6) What is the impact on the project in terms of
quantities/schedule of either a reduction or an increase in
amounts budgeted?
b. Budget Execution
This element includes procedures employed sub-
sequent to budget submission and approval. The focus is on
current year funds and their use once they have been authorized
by Congress and apportioned through the Executive Branch. De-
cisions on cost implications are discussed in sub-paragraph 4d.
Once obligational authority has been received by the project
office, it must be further apportioned to contractors and sub-
ordinate supporting commands. Some of the decisions required
within the budget execution element are:
(1) Are current year funds sufficient?
(2) Are the requirements of contractors and sub-
ordinate activities valid and well justified?
(3) Are current year funds being obligated at a
rate consistent with full obligation of all annual appropria-
tions by the end of the fiscal year?
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(4) Are funds being spent as intended? Are incen-
tives working?
(5) What flexibility is available to shift funds?
c. Contracting
Included in this element are the decisions that
must be made in contracting with the defense industry and
establishing commitments with subordinate commands. The present
status of this project, well into the development phase, requires
the focus of attention in the contracting element beyond the
early decisions of source selection, type of contract, etc.
Decisions on procurement include:
(1) Are the various contracts appropriate in type
and terms?
(2) Are government contract changes valid? Are
they properly authorized? Are they necessary?
(3) Are contractor change proposals necessary?
Are they being processed in a timely manner so as to avoid
delays?
(4) Are incentives in contracts eliciting the
performance desired?
d. Financial Control
The key element of financial control can affect
the decisions of the program manager in all areas. The scar-
city of funds and intense outside interest focused on DOD fund-
ing dictate that the program manager pay careful attention to
control of the funds at his disposal.
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(1) Is progress being achieved at a cost higher,
or lower, than budgeted? Is work performed, controlled in
sufficient detail so as to preclude overrun?
(2) What are the cost impacts of program slipp-
age? What alternatives exist?
(3) Are the costs of contract modifications within
funding authority?
(4) Are contract costs reported by the contractor
valid? Are they reasonable? Do they reflect effort that can
be related to the project?
(5) Are overhead rates valid? Is the business base
changing? What impact?
e. Project Administration
This final element includes decisions not other-
wise categorized, such as travel, major meetings/reviews,
reports, etc. Decisions in this area involve such questions as:
(1) What major milestones are required? (DSARC,
etc.
)
(2) Is proposed travel necessary? Are the right
people planned for the trip.
(3) Is the program review scheduled at an appro-
priate time?
(4) Are incoming reports routed to the appropriate
responsible individual? Is the information useful and used?
(5) Are outgoing reports in fact required? Is the
data being provided accurate and complete? Will it accomplish




(6) Are personnel resources adequate to get the
job done?
D. INFORMATION ANALYSIS
Within the context of the business decision elements estab-
lished above, there exist needs for information to support
those decisions. This section discusses the nature of informa-
tion required and suggests potential sources for that informa-
tion.
1. Budget Formulation
In working to formulate his portion of the NAVAIR sec-
tion of the DOD Budget, the FIREBRAND Project Manager needs to
know such things as the schedule of input required, the format
for submission and the detail of information required. Most of
this information comes from OPNAV through NAVAIR- 08 in the form
of budget calls, etc. as described in the PPBS instructions.
Actually, the information is obtainable on a more informal basis
from the program's funding sponsor in OPNAV (OP-09 8) as illus-
trated in figure 5-2. Once the reporting schedule is known,
the actual data must be collected from field activities and
contractors for support of future fiscal year budgets.
Within the structure of the budget process, an activity
usually receives an indication of the funding that may be made
available for future years. The program manager needs to know
what these figures are for his project and whether those pro-





In this very important element of overall management
control, the program manager must decide how much money to
authorize to field activities and contractors. One important
factor in making this decision is input from field activities
and contractors as to their needs for the fiscal year (or
quarter) under consideration. Once the funds have been author-
ized, it is critical to the success of the project to ensure
that those funds are obligated according to plan. In the con-
text of single year appropriations, funds which are not used
in the year for which they are appropriated may not be carried
over to succeeding years. The program manager must know how
much has been obligated within each activity that holds funds
and a projection of the future. Flexibility in shifting funds
is particularly important in this area, so the program manager




In this element, the program manager needs to be kept
informed as to the status of any ongoing contract negotiations
Especially important in contract administration is the process
of changes. The program manager needs to know what changes
have been proposed, by whom, how much they will cost and what
impact they will have on the rest of the project. This infor-
mation comes through formal change proposals by contractors
and suggestions made by government personnel.
4 Financial and Cost Control
To keep track of this critical element, the program
manager needs to know how much money has been authorized in
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total, where it has been allocated and whether it is being
spent for intended purposes consistent with complete obligation,
He must know whether money is being spent consistent with a
contractor's plan or if costs vary significantly from what was
anticipated.
5. Project Administration
To make effective decisions in this area, the project
manager must know what travel is required and which skills must
be present. He must be aware of when reports are due at the
project office and what the schedule for outgoing reports is.
E. A CONTROL SYSTEM PROPOSAL
1. General
The analysis of decisions and information highlights a
need for' information that provides the program manager a signif-
icant degree of flexibility required to respond to changing
demands in the evolution of the development of the missile.
The system envisioned to provide that information must be re-
sponsive to two different kinds of demands. There are those
demands that are fairly well predictable. For example, in
the process of developing the airframe, wind tunnel tests were
conducted. It was obvious that if the tests failed, some con-
tingency configuration plan needed to be ready. This kind of
decision can be anticipated in time to gather information from
various sources, and have alternatives available in advance.
The information system supporting this type of decision might
be called a Dynamic Management Information System. On the
other hand, the program manager must make many decisions in
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response to problems that emerge without a great degree of
anticipation. A good example of this kind of decision is the
short fuzed response to OPNAV during the budget process. The
type of system required to support this kind of decision might
be called a Static Management Information System, where the
objective is not so much to have alternatives available, but
rather to have sources for the information ready to respond.
This system may be seen conceptually in a form similar to
figure 6-1.
2. Inputs
As in any information/control system, the basic effort
involved in the processing and conversion of existing informa-
tion inputs into a more useful format intended to support the
decision maker. Some of the inputs being converted by the
FIREBRAND MCS are discussed here.
a. Budget Guidance
Information received from the NAVAIR Comptroller
(08) and others regarding the schedule, format, target dollar
levels, etc. of the various budget submissions are received
and channelled, for example, into the Management Notebook.
b. Letter Progress Reports
Monthly narrative reports of progress from con-
tractors and others are converted into information to update
the planning calendar, budget control reports, contract status
reports, etc. For example, the letter progress report from
TRA may contain information that results in a decision to delay



























cc CO £> aR •^ R o
12 s < nO 3 R H














K W EhW cs Ctf













































































c. Cost Performance Reports
This major input from the Cost/Schedule Control
System is used to update budget control, contract status and
financial control elements of the dynamic control system.
d. Contract Funds Status
This report is a major source for updating the
financial and cost control report.
e. Contract Negotiation Status
Information from the Procuring Contracting Officer
(PCO) on the status of negotiations, feeds the contract status
report.
f. Engineering Change Proposals
These modifications to previously agreed terms of
the development contract will affect contract status and finan-
cial cost control elements, among others.
3 . Static Management Control System
a. Program Master Plan (PMP)
As alluded to earlier, this plan already exists.
It should be made an integral part of the total management con-
trol system. The PMP should be consulted and reviewed with
=ach major decision during the life of the project. The goals
and schedule established by this plan must be considered as
oudgets are formulated or as contracts are established or mod-
ified. The PMP will have an important influence on the plan-
ling calendar.
b. Management Notebook
This element of the control system is intended to
>rovide the source of information for those short fuzed
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decisions required of the program manager. The management
notebook should contain the highlights from elements of the
dynamic control system. Broken down into three major sections
of budget control, financial and cost control and contract
status, this notebook should have the important, "big picture"
information needed to make initial judgments on problems. For
example, the budget control section must include the total
budget picture for the life of the contract broken down by
fiscal years and showing amounts of funds required, current
budget estimates and shortfalls.
In recognition of the nature of the problems to
be supported by information in the management notebook, it
should include within each section the potential sources for
information that is not readily available within the program
office. The recent (July 1978) issue of the FIREBRAND Tele-
phone Directory is an excellent base for this kind of informa-
tion. It already contains names, addresses and telephone
numbers of key personnel in the following government and con-
tractor organizations:
FIREBRAND Project Office (APC-6)
Armament Development & Test Center (Elgin AFB)
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS) Office
DCAS Planning Office Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical
Naval Air Development Center (NADC) Warminster
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
NAVAIR, Point Mugu (AIR-6 30)
Naval Avionics Center (NAC)
Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC)
Naval Material Command (NAVMAT)
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
Naval Surface Weapons Center (NSWC) Dahlgren
Naval Weapons Center (NWC) China Lake
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy































Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC) Point Mugu
U.S. Army Missile Material Readiness Command (MIRCOM)
White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico
Bird Engineering Research Associates
Control Data Corporation (CDC)
Mantech of New Jersey
Marquardt Company, Van Nuys
Systems Consultants Inc. (SCI)
Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical (TRA) San Diego
Thiokol Corporation, Huntsville
Universal Systems Inc.
This existing information could be expanded to include other
agencies which have the potential to provide information or
assistance on emerging problems. A partial list of activities
not presently listed in the FIREBRAND telephone book but which
may be included in the management notebook are:
Office of Management and Budget
Congressional Staff Officers
Office of Legislative Affairs
NAVSUP functional codes
NAVCOMPT functional codes




Naval Audit Service (consulting Services)
Some effort should be made to summarize the expertise available
from all of these activities, the procedures for obtaining ser-
vices and key personnel to be contacted. A cross reference of
these sources according to their areas of expertise would also
be useful.
What has been described here are only a few exam-
ples of things that should be included in the management note-
book. Any significant source document or secondary source of














The planning calendar really belongs in both the
static and dynamic systems. It is envisioned as a tool that
will focus the program manager's attention on significant
events both in the long range and in the near term. It is not
intended to take the place of the complex technical development
schedule which should be an integral part of the master engineer-
ing plan. The planning calendar is the source for recording
major milestones to facilitate the administrative support for
them.
Three specific formats are suggested. Format One
is a one page look at the entire life of the project with major
events annotated as they are planned to occur. This format
should be updated as the program master plan changes. The in-
tent is to focus on major events and their perspective within
the overall project.
Format Two should be a three month forecast illus-
trating the current and following two months. This display
should record more detailed events that tend to support the
major milestones on Format One.
Format Three should reflect the program manager '
s
schedule for the current week and one or two succeeding weeks.
• 4. Dynamic Management Control System
a. Budget Control Reports
This section of the management control system
should contain all information necessary to prepare and submit
budget requests and to control budget execution. As a matter
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of historical record, the submission guidelines provided by
higher authority along with a copy of DOD Instruction 7045.7
and subordinate implementing instructions should be included
as part of this section. Also, a chronological history of all
previous formal budget submittals and responses to informal
requests from OPNAV sponsors should be filled in this section
as well. Previous back-up data provided by contractors and
NAVAIR field activities is also appropriate for inclusion.
Even though it may be more appropriate to include in the manage-
ment notebook of the static system, information on budget flexi-
bility may also be appropriately included here. Information
that will enable the program manager to respond to "what if"
type questions from OPNAV, Congress or others must be readily
available. For example, the program manager must be able to
respond to a conjecture that asks, "What if we cut your budget
$2,000,000 in FY80?" or "How much can we save by stretching
the project out six months?"
The kind of information necessary for control of
budget execution is that which will provide the most flexibility
to the program manager. At the front, there should be a record
of funds authorized, how they have been apportioned for the
current fiscal year and planned for the next two fiscal years.
Figure 6-2 is a suggested format that will accommodate these
needs. As changes are made to a given fiscal year, the appro-
priate page must be updated and replaced. Within the budget
execution element, the program manager needs to know how each














fiscal year. This data must be displayed on a single page to
facilitate making adjustments as required. Figure 6-3 suggests
a summary obligation status report that highlights obligations
against plan. Finally, the detailed progress of each activity
must be measured each month. A subsection for each activity
should follow the summary obligation status. Each subsection
should display obligation progress against a straight line plan
on a simple graphical representation, backed up by the work
request documentation and monthly reports of obligation which
should contain explanations for significant deviations,
b. Contract Status Reports
This section should contain a one page report from
the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) on the status of nego-
tiations in progress. As a minimum the report should identify
the name of the contractor, type of contract, areas of agree-
ment, significant problem issues (with government position vs
contractor position) and a prognosis. The report should be
made at least monthly or more often if the situation dictates.
At least equally important as the status of ongoing
negotiations for future contracts is information regarding the
administration of existing contracts. It is through the ve-
hicle of contract administration that the program manager con-
trols the major dollar value of his project. It is most im-
portant to the program manager to keep apprised of the potential
for the contractor to deliver on time and at or below cost.
Since schedule and cost are so important they are given their
own section of the control system and will be discussed in the
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element in contract administration concerns performance. This
control over the engineering progress of the development is
part of the Master Engineering Plan which is beyond the scope
of this current effort.
Other significant elements of contract administra-
tion that are addressed in this area of the control system in-
clude: changes, protests, disputes, government equipment, legal
concerns, etc. One of the significant cost growth factors in
government contracts is the proliferation of changes subsequent
to negotiation of the original contract. In order to control
these changes they must be made visible to the program manager.
Before being effected, significant changes (above a dollar
threshhold designated by the program manager) must be submitted
in a one or two page standard format for program manager ap-
proval. The proposal must include, as a minimum, the nature of
the proposed change, the cost, the positive effect, 'consequences
of not making the change, and alternatives. Once a change has
seen approved, either an equitable adjustment or a negotiated
:?rice change is required. The status of these dollar impacts
nust be maintained and integrated with the overall cost control.
The other elements noted above will not be discus-
sed in detail, but should be included within the contract status
eports section. Appendix B suggests in more detail areas of
oncern for a contract administrator/project manager,
c. Financial and Cost Reports
Well over 85% of the funds received and budgeted
or FY78, FY79 and FY80 are or will be contracted to civilian
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contractors, making control of the cost and schedule of those
contracts the top business priority for the program manager.
Fortunately for the FIREBRAND program manager, DOD Cost/Schedule
Control System (C/SCS) reports are requirements of the FIREBRAND
contract with Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical (TRA) . The job of this
area of the management control system is to analyze and report
the data from C/SCS in a meaningful manner.
The two most basic indicators of the Cost Perform-
ance Report (CPR) are schedule variance and cost variance which
tell the program manager whether the program is ahead or behind
schedule and at or below anticipated cost. These variances
should be tracked month by month to assess their trends and
magnitude. It is important to keep the absolute dollar value
of the variances in perspective. The percentage relationships
and performance indices discussed in Appendix A provide this
perspective. Trends are most useful when they can forecast the
future. The Latest Revised Estimate (LRE) of the CPR is the
future condition must significant to the program manager.
Validation of the reported LRE can be accomplished by extra-
polating the trends of variance indicators. The details of
establishing graphs and reports to validate the LRE are ex-
plained in the Army Management Engineering Training Agency
(AMETA) publication, Status, Trends and Projections /~\7 which
should be consulted in establishing desired trend analysis
charts.
A caution noted in Appendix A is worthy of repeti-
tion here. Information from the CPR data represent an effect
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which is usually caused by some technical problem. The pro-
gram manager should be advised of the source of abberations in
CPR data and given recommendations as to alternative ways to
proceed, including cost and schedule implications,
d. Action Item Reports
Across the entire spectrum of program management
concerns there are problem items that will occur which require
resolution over a period of time. These problems usually sur-
face during on-site program reviews, in regular monthly pro-
gress reports, in the analysis of variances portion of the
Cost Performance Report, etc. This section of the management
control system is designed to keep track of those problem items
including the status of progress being made toward their
resolution.
Appendix C describes the Action Item program in
more detail. Essentially, a problem is described, catalogued
and given a unique problem number. The proposed solution,
contractor comments and project management comments are entered,
and then an activity is given specific tasks to accomplish with
a due date. Update reports are filed as progress or due dates
dictate. The data is entered into a computer file which can
be dumped periodically to produce both a management summary of
all problems and a detailed status of each open problem.
F. IMPORTANCE OF EXCEPTION REPORTING
Underlying the system just described has been a principle
not specifically stated, yet vital to the success of control.
In view of the vast amount of information bearing on the
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management of the FIREBRAND project, the information reported
to the project manager must be of an exception nature that high-
lights problem areas. This principle is perhaps best illus-
trated in the use of data from the Cost Performance Report of
the C/SCS input. The information reported to the project man-
ager as part of the output of the dynamic control system should
De that which highlights problems. For example, the project
nanager should be informed when variances exceed a certain
threshhold (to be set by the project manager) in either a posi-
tive of negative direction. This principle of exception report-




VII. A MODEL FOR ESTABLISHING CONTROL
A. INTRODUCTION
On the strength of experience gained in this thesis effort,
it is possible to establish a model procedure for use by in-
dividuals in a management context similar to that of the
FIREBRAND Program Manager. The use of this model is not lim-
ited to program managers in the Navy, nor for that matter to
managers in a matrix organization anywhere. The principles
established may be applied by any manager of an organization
that is fairly modest in size with a reasonably well defined
mission. The process would be useful to the director of a
division at a Navy Inventory Control Point or even the head
of a department on a ship.
B. THE MODEL
1. A Conceptual Diagram
Figure 7-1 highlights the steps in the process sug-
gested to develop a management control system. The process
also may be applied to an organization that has an existing
management information/control system in order to refine it




The first several steps establish the foundation of
knowledge necessary to undertake an intelligent design effort.
a. Organizational Analysis
While it may appear obvious, even trite, it is
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understand the organization for which the control system is
intended. This analysis should include an appreciation for
the informal lines of communication as well as the formal
system. The designer should know and understand the basic
mission of the organization.
b. Establishment of Goals
If goals do not exist they must be established and
clearly stated. If they are already in existence, they must
be understood by the system designer. It is the progress to-
ward accomplishment of these goals (which in turn support the
mission) that the control system will be required to measure.
c. Research
At the same time as the system designer is learning
about the organization and its goals he should be conducting
research into the history of information management and con-
trol. As a minimum, this research should include reading
Robert Anthony ' s , Planning and Control Systems: A Framework
for Analysis / 2j , and the literature on management information
system design.
d. Establishment of Perspective
Once the basic research has been done and the
control system designer is comfortable with the information
control concepts and an appreciation of the organization, the
final step in the educational effort is to establish a per-
spective for the control system. The designer should under-
stand where the organization fits within Anthony's framework,
the general nature of the types of decisions to be made (e.g.
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strategic vs control) and the kinds of information that will
be required to support those decisions. It may be useful to
set this perspective down in writing, to be reviewed and re-
fined as the process continues.
3 . Analysis
Once the basic educational effort has led to the estab-
lishment of a perspective within which the designer may operate,
the work of analysis begins.
a. Decision Analysis
This important and difficult process may be made
easier for the system designer who has had no previous expe-
rience in making decisions on the level of the organization
for which he is designing a control system. The designer
should solicit the input of the decision maker; however, cau-
tion must be exercised to ensure that the decision maker does
not inhibit the creative initiative of the analyst to come up
with a fresh outlook on the important decisions required. If
the designer/analyst breaks the decision analysis process into
two phases he may find it more logical. The first phase would
involve a "big picture" general definition of the types of
decisions to be made; e.g. financial decisions, technical
decisions, etc. Then, within this macro framework, the an-
alyst can move to identify specific decisions required of the
decision maker. Decision analysis alone is insufficient to
support the development of the entire system. Other forms
of analysis must follow. Decision analysis will provide a




b. Information Requirements Analysis
Once the specific decisions have been defined , the
analyst should determine the information needed to support
those decisions. It is not necessary to establish the detailed
lists of information necessary for each and every decision;
rather it is only required that the general nature of the in-
formation be defined. This step should also involve specify-
ing the potential source of the information required.
c. Existing Information Flow Analysis
Once the nature of information needs has been
sstablished, it is a natural next step to determine whether
any of that information is already provided. At the same
time, elements of existing information flows which were not
previously identified as needs, should be used to review the
requirements analysis to determine whether the existing flow
nay in fact be needed somewhere. During the analysis of exist-
mg information flow, the analyst should be alert to any secu-
rity concerns which affect the current flow of information in
Drder that they may be applied to the new system. Information
malysis tends to support the static portion of the management
:ontrol system.
d. Feedback
Throughout the analysis process, any knowledge
jained in each step of the process should be fed back to the
perspective established during the educational phase to re-
fine and perhaps revise that perspective which may then have




This final phase takes the conceptual structure defined
during analysis and puts it into practice.
a. Filtration and Condensation
The value of a management control system lies in
its ability to filter out the important bits of information
from the wide range of all the information that exists and
condense it into a useful format for the decision maker. The
degree to which gross information can be filtered depends on
the time and money available to do it. Since information has
a value that diminishes with time, it must be reported quickly.
If it takes too long to condense into a more useful form, the
information may become worthless. If it costs more to produce
the information than the benefits provided by that information
then it is not worth obtaining and condensing. Since he will
rely heavily on this filtered information to make decisions,
the decision-maker must be intimately involved in the judgment
as to what information gets filtered, to what degree and by
whom. The filtration condensation must not distort the intent
of the information.
b. Reports Design
When the nature of the information to be reported
is known, the control system designer may turn to the format
of the report. The guiding principle in this regard is sim-
plicity. Reports must be as brief as possible and still trans-
mit their message. The reports must also be action oriented;
i.e., provide the decision maker with all that he needs to




Once their design has been established, initial
reports may be produced for use by the decision maker. As
these reports are used their design must be reviewed and per-
haps revised.
C . SUMMARY
Not every step in this process is required to be pursued
to the same degree by every control system designer. If a
designer is well versed in the details of the organization and
comfortable with its goals he can move more quickly to estab-
lishing the perspective. Regardless of the background of the
system designer, he should approach the process in some logical
manner similar to the order suggested in this chapter. De-
signing reports before analyzing decisions that need to be made
is likely to result in reports that are either excessive or
insufficient to meet the needs of the decision maker.
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis has examined the conceptual framework for
management control. The concepts of two theoretical frame-
works — one for planning and control and the other for manage-
ment information systems — were applied to an existing weap-
ons system acquisition project to develop an outline for a
formal management control system. Due to constraints of lack
of technical expertise of the author , limited time available
and unavoidable importunities of timing (this effort was under-
taken during a very busy time for the project office staff
who were concentrating much of their effort on a major con-
figuration change and a serious review of the program's cost),
only the first part of the job has been done. On the strength
of experience gained during this effort, a model has been de-
signed to guide others who may seek to undertake a similar task
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. Importance of Management Control
Planning and control are two of the more important
elements of management, without which a manager probably will
make uninformed decisions that may not be focused on the im-
portant goals of his organization. These two elements are
embodied in Robert Anthony's concept of Management Control.
2. System Acquisition Perspective
The FIREBRAND Anti-Ship Missile Target (ASMT) acquisi-
tion project which is well into the development stage of the
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acquisition process is squarely within the Management Control
area of Anthony's framework. Not all acquisition projects
will be classified as falling in this area. A newer project,
in the early stages of design might fit more appropriately
nearer to the definition and needs of the strategic planning
area. A more mature project (indeed, the FIREBRAND project
as it evolves into the production phase) would be defined by
Anthony as in the Operational Control area of his framework.
It is an important first step to understand the perspective of
the project before proceeding too far along with decision




A management control system should be designed with a
view toward the nature of the decisions to be made by the
manager. The Gorry and Scott-Morton framework for management
information systems defines three types of decisions made by
managers operating within Anthony's framework. Most of the
decisions being made by the FIREBRAND Program Manager are of
the unstructured or semi- structured nature. The implications
of this are that the information required to support those
decisions is similarly undefined. The management control
system structured to report that kind of information must
contain a broad range of information on which the decision
maker can draw to respond to short- fuzed, unstructured, non-
repetetive type questions and problems.
4 Control System Design
The design of a management control system is a com-
plex process that should not be undertaken lightly. While it
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is not considered appropriate to employ to total systems ap-
proach to management control system design, the process should
be orderly and well planned. Before beginning any substantive
work on the system, the designer should educate himself on the
basic concepts of management control and management informa-
tion systems. Then, after developing a good appreciation for
the workings of the organization for which the system is being
designed, he should proceed with an analysis of decisions and
information leading ultimately to a simple, responsive struc-
ture for management control.
C . RECOMMENDAT IONS
1. Establishment of the System
The system framework proposed in chapter six should be
used by the FIREBRAND Project Office in considering its needs,
its existing system, and any resultant changes required. The
precise format of the reports should be modified to accommodate
the desires of the ultimate user — the Program Manager.
2
.
Extension of the System
Once the initial business oriented portion of the sys-
tem is set up and running to the satisfaction of the program
manager, work should continue with the establishment of a sys-
tem to control the technical progress of the project. The
program developed by Systems Consultants Inc. (SCI) is con-
sidered an excellent base for this technical control system.
3. Further Study
Follow-on work in the establishment and extension of
the system using the model suggested in chapter seven is
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advised. Testing the model in related but different organiza-




COST/SCHEDULE AND CONTROL SYSTEM (C/SCS)
The DOD Cost/Schedule Control System (C/SCS) is designed
to measure cost, schedule and technical performance of con-
tractors in the acquisition processes. The two principle




DOD Instruction 7000.2, "Performance Measurement for
Selected Acquisitions," establishes criteria for an effective
contractor cost/schedule control system. These criteria are
intended to establish a common base of data that may be ag-
gregated into reports at high summary levels within DOD.
There are five criteria specified in DOD Instruction 7000.2.
They are, (1) Organization, (2) Planning and Budgeting, (3)
Accounting, (4) Analysis and (5) Revisions. These criteria
are summarized and explained in a DOD presentation on Instruc-
tion 7000.2 as follows:
1. Organization
Contractors are required to define all work and re-
sources using the contract work breakdown structure (WBS)
.
The internal structure of the contractor's organization (and
major subcontractors) must be integrated with the WBS. Cost
accounts must be established for each unique managerial level
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dictated by the WBS . A typical WBS is illustrated in figure
A-l. The integration of the organization with the WBS may be
seen in figure A-2.
2. Planning and Budgeting
The criteria established in the planning and budgeting
area are that the contractor must:
a. Schedule all work at the lowest defined element of
the WBS.
b. Identify physical products, milestones, technical
performance goals, or other indicators that will be used to
measure output.
c. Establish budgets to the lowest level of contract
planning (work package) by cost element.
d. Identify the relationships of budgets or standards
of underlying work authorization systems to budgets for work
packages.
As was the case with criteria for organization, the
intent of planning and budgeting criteria is to integrate all




Criteria for accounting practices are summarized as
follows:
a. Apply actual cost consistent with budgets.
b. Summarize actual cost from cost accounts directly
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c. Summarize actual cost from cost account directly
into the functional organization.
d. Record all costs.
4. Analysis
The focus of the criteria for analysis is consistent
with the principle of management by exception; e.g., the





(3) Labor Rate Variance
(4) Overhead Rate Variance
(5) Material Rate Variance




(4) Other Direct Costs
c. Variances shall be routinely analyzed and explained.
d. Variance analysis shall be used routinely as a
basis for managerial corrective action.
5. Revisions
The bottom line on revisions to the scope of the project
is that they will be made expeditiously upon approval and never
retroactively. Specifically, the instruction calls for:
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a. Incorporation of contractual changes in a timely
manner.
b. Prohibition on retroactive changes to applied cost
except for errors and routine adjustments.
c. Preventing revisions to the contract budget base-
line except for government directed changes to the contractual
effort.
d. Advising the procuring activity - immediately - of
any baseline budget or schedule changes.
e. Minimizing changes to work packages.
When viewed as a whole, these criteria are designed to
establish a cost/schedule control system that will produce
management information which will allow the program manager
to understand those specific areas of the project that are
not proceeding according to plan and whether those variances
affect cost or schedule or both.
B. REPORTS
DOD Instruction 7000.10 establishes reporting requirements
within the C/SCS. The three reports described are, (1) Cost
Performance (CPR) , (2) Contract Funds Status Report (CFSR) and
(3) Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR)
.
1. Cost Performance Report (CPR)
The CPR is designed to report data for use in measur-
ing contractors' cost and schedule performance, in order to
provide early identification of problems having significant
cost impact and for use in making and validating management




Illustrated by figure A-3, CPR Format One presents
data to measure cost and schedule performance arranged by sum-
mary level work breakdown structure elements. Data is reported
for the current period (usually one month) and cumulative for
the project/contract to date, with projections for the project
at completion. Actual work performed for each WBS element is
compared against plans, and variances in schedule and cost are
noted.
b. Format Two
Figure A-4 illustrates Format Two which provides
similar data as that on Format One except that it is broken
down by organizational or functional cost categories rather
than WBS. For example, Format Two may provide data for such
categories as, Production, Manufacturing Support, Engineering,
etc., which provides a different perspective on the variances.
c. Format Three
This format is illustrated by figure A-5. It des-
cribes the budget baseline plan against which performance is
measured. This part of the CPR shows the original contract
target cost, any negotiated changes to date, and potential
changes that have been approved except for pricing (unpriced
work) . The budgeted cost of work scheduled is shown as it
stands through the date of the report, and forecasted for each
of the next six months, and the balance of the contract broken
down into specified periods (e.g., six month periods). In
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addition to funds budgeted directly to scheduled work, the
report also reveals the total amounts budgeted for general and
administrative costs and as a management reserve.
d. Format Four
Figure A-6 illustrates Format Four of the CPR.
This format provides manpower loading forecasts for correla-
tion with the budget plan and cost estimate predictions. The
organizational or functional categories used in Format Two are
displayed here with numbers of equivalent man-months for each
category for the current period, and cumulative through the
end of the project. The arrangement of data in this form per-
mits easy comparison with the baseline budget plan (Format
Three) and against variances by functional category (Format
Two) .
e. Format Five
The Problem Analysis Report (Format Five) is illus-
trated by figure A-7. This is a narrative supplement to the
other pages of the CPR intended to be used to explain signif-
icant cost and schedule variances and other contract problems.
This data is supposed to be used by the program manager to:
(1) evaluate contract performance, (2) identify actual and
potential problem areas having significant cost impact, and
(3) provide valid, timely program status information to higher
authority.
f. General
The requirement for submitting the CPR is called
out in the basic contract. It is usually submitted monthly.
The level of detail to be reported normally will be limited to
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level three of the WBS or higher, except where problem areas
are indicated. The specific variance threshholds requiring
analysis and explanation are negotiated between the government
and the contractor.
2. Contract Funds Status Report (CFSR)
The CFSR is intended to provide funding data to assist
DOD management in: (a) updating and forecasting contract fund
requirements, (b) planning and decision making on funding
changes, (c) developing fund requirements and budget estimates,
and (d) determining when excess funds are available. To accom-
plish these ends, the form requires data on funds authorized,
commitments, and expenditures accrued through the date of the
report and projected into the future for the duration of the
contract. Figure A- 8 illustrates the CFSR.
3. Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR)
The C/SSR is designed to take the place of the CPR in
small contracts. The same data as is required in the heading
of Format Three of the CPR (Original Target Cost, Changes,
Unpriced Work and Total Baseline Budget) combined with the
performance data of Format One is merged into a single form
illustrated by figure A-9. Data is to be reported to level
three of the WBS or higher. Reports are required as specified
in the contract, but not to exceed monthly.
C. ANALYSIS
The data provided in the reports required by C/SCS will be
useful only to the extent that it is transformed into meaning-
ful information through analysis. The U.S. Army Management
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Engineering Training Agency (AMETA) offers a course which
includes instruction on techniques for analysis of C/SCS data.
An AMETA developed publication, Status, Trends and Projections
/~4_7 is used in that course and though the foreword of that
publication disclaims its utility outside the classroom, it has
been observed to be a significant working tool for defense
contractors who report into C/SCS. The information in this
section of Appendix A is drawn liberally from that publication.
Readers interested in more depth should obtain a copy from
AMETA which is located in Rock Island, Illinois.
1. Technical Foundation
Cost and schedule performance status, trends, and fore-
casts usually do not, within themselves, constitute an end
product; rather, they represent an effect which is the result
of some cause. More than likely, some technical problem exists
that is causing a cost or schedule variance. These causes must
be identified and corrected to reverse the trend of an unfavor-
able variance. Cost and schedule information merely highlight
situations and evoke questions which are generally satisfied
by some technical answer. This relationship between C/SCS
data and the real source of problems associated with weapons




Performance Measurement System Attributes
A performance measurement/control system follows a
logically sequenced set of events from which an analyst may
draw conclusions. The control of an acquisition project is
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no exception. Six important attributes of an effective per-
formance measurement/control system are:
a. Identification and Organization of the Work
The system should establish cost accounts such
that work is identified to the lowest level of the work break-
down structure (WBS)
.
b. Establishment of Baselines
All authorized work should be scheduled. Budgets
should be assigned to manageable units of work. The time
phased summation of these budgets then becomes the established
baseline. In C/SCS terms, this is the time-phased budgeted
cost of work scheduled (BCWS)
.
c. Measurement of Current Status
The system should tell whether that which was ac-
complished is that which was intended, and whether it cost
what was projected. In the C/SCS this is budgeted cost of
work performed (BCWP) compared against BCWS to get a schedule
variance. The actual cost of work performed (ACWP) is com-
pared to BCWP to get cost variance.
d. Identification of Trends
A good system will show whether variances are
growing or diminishing. Trend identification relies a lot
on historical data.
e. Predicting the Future
Trend analysis itself is interesting, but is of
little use unless it helps the decision maker in making de-
cisions about the future.
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f. Indicating a Need for Management Action
The best system not only highlights areas which
require decisions, but also suggests who must take action to
implement the decision.
3. Variance Determination
Calculating variances from the CPR is a relatively
straight forward process; in fact, both cost and schedule
variances are provided on Format One (refer to figure A-3)
.
Knowing how these variances are calculated, though, is impor-
tant to appreciating how some of the trends are established.
a. Schedule Variance (SV)
This is understood as indicating how much of the
work scheduled to be accomplished (BCWS) has been accomplished
(BCWP) . In terms of the CPR Format One, this means:
SV = BCWP - BCWS
(col. 10) (col. 8) (col. 7)
As constituted, this simple formula results in a negative
figure for schedule variance when the project (or a particular
element) is behind schedule.
b. Cost Variance (CV)
This variance highlights the comparison of the
planned cost of the work performed in terms of the budget
(BCWP) against the actual cost incurred in the accomplishment
of the work (ACWP) . Using the CPR Format One again:
CV _ BCWP - ACWP
(col. 11) (col. 8) (col. 9)




Knowing how these variances are computed permits com-
parison against a base which lends more significance to the
variance and its trend. AMETA suggests comparing the schedule





The cost variance should be related to the amount of work
accomplished:
BcVTcliM] = CV PERCENTAGE
4 . Performance Indices and Factors
In addition to the two percentage relationships just
described, there are many other indices and factors which may
assist the analyst in his attempt to quantify performance.
Several suggested by AMETA are:
a. Cost Performance Index (CPI)
The CPI indicates the cost efficiency with which
work has been accomplished.
CPI BCWP
ACWP
b. Schedule Performance Index (SPI)
The SPI indicates the percentage of work accom-
plished against that planned.
SPI = BCWPBCWS
c. Percent Complete
This index compares the amount of budget (work)





BAG (col. 12) " URGENT COMPLETE
There are many other such combinations and comparisons which
are not discussed here. The point to be made is that variances
and other data should have some base against which to be com-
pared in order to be most significant.
5. Trend Analysis
a. General
Past and current data are often used as predictions
of future performance. The extrapolation of historical per-
formance trends to establish future positions is an important
and practical tool for the analyst. The approach which should
be taken relative to data extrapolations is:
(1) Examine current and historical performance
data for trends,
(2) Interpret and draw conclusions from the trends,
(3) Use the trends, interpretations and conclusions
to predict future positions,
(4) Make decisions on action necessary to amend
any future projections that are unfavorable.
b. Data Forms
In order to facilitate trend analysis, data may
be presented in different formats. Two common forms illus-
trated in the AMETA publication are:
(1) Tabular Data
This is the data presented in a chart or a table
Only simple brief pieces of data should be treated in this form




The popular line graph or bar chart is very
revealing in highlighting trends. Care must be exercised in
avoiding oversmoothing which could make changes less easy to
detect. Choices exist for displaying data incrementally,
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Design of a Contract Administration Management Control and
Information System
General Requirement : The need for information that impacts on
cost, schedule and performance.
Specific Requirements:
PRI Information Needs
A Financial & Cost:


















A Analysis of Perform-
ance & Trends
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prime)
*Only general levels of priority have been assigned to information
needs. "A" is considered more important than a "B" priority item;
but no effort has been made to distinguish among those assigned




















































C Sources of Support
Other Gov't Agencies
SYSCOM, Legal, DCAA,






Other issues to consider across all management information needs
and uses:
Priorities, system control, updating procedures, fre-
quency of reporting/action, use of exception data,
satisfying reporting requirements, use of a management
model (uniquely designed) , categories of information
(e.g., job, reporting, change, long term, short term,





FIREBRAND ACTION ITEM PROGRAM
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW
This program is available from the VITRO corporation and
with minor modification can be adapted for use by FIREBRAND.
The program records and tracks problems from inception to
resolution. Each problem is assigned a unique six-digit
number that facilitates sorting. Input forms provide oppor-
tunity for brief narrative description of the problem along
with a proposed solution and comments by the contractor and
project office. Actions and due dates may also be assigned.
As progress is made toward resolution, update information may
be input. The output provides an executive summary for quick




Each problem is assigned a unique six-digit number
which will allow immediate identification of the problem area.
The first digit identifies the major area of concern. The
second digit may be used to describe a sub-area. Digits three
and four may be used to designate the source within which the
problem was first identified; e.g. 11 could represent program
review #1, 12 is program review #2, etc. Digits five and six
identify the particular problem within the sub-area. A sug-




major areas and sub-areas are subjected to revision or ex-
pansion as necessary to meet the needs of the program manager.
The last major field is intended to permit members of the
project office to file reminders to themselves or receive
direction from the program manager.
2. Input
Initial input is made on the format illustrated in
figure C-2. The form is generally self explanatory. Narrative
comments should be brief and to the point. Update of progress
is input in the format illustrated in figure C-3.
3. Output
The program provides two output formats. A management
summary similar to figure C-4 provides a quick overview of the
status of each problem. More detailed back-up information is










MAJOR AREAS AND SUB-AREAS
1 — Business Management
11 - Budget Submission
12 - Budget Execution
13 - Contract Negotiation
14 - Contract Administration






23 - Electrical System
24 - Recovery System
25 - Destruct System
3 — Propulsion
31 - Engine
32 - Fuel System
33 - Booster
4 — Guidance and Control System
41 - Hardware
42 - Software
5 — Target Auxiliary Systems
6 -- Reliability and Maintainability
7 — Test and Evaluation
8 — Safety
9 — Integrated Logistic Support
— Program Direction
00 - Program Manager
01 - Deputy
02 - Business Manager
3 - Project Engineer
04 - Planning Officer



























(Task to be Accomplished)
(Task to be Accomplished)





Contractor Rep. Action Activity Pep




TO: COMPACMISTESTCEN (Code 2151
POINT MUGU, CA 93042
PROBLEM NUMBER: ACTION ITEM
UPDATE













ILSMT MANAGEMENT SUMMARY: FILE FBPA01 7 JUN 78
PROBLEM *STATUS *PROBLEM STATEMENT
210002 OPEN PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS OF MISSION
PERFORMANCE
*SOURCE DOCUMENT *SOURCE DOCUMENT ID *SOURCE DOCUMENT DATE
QTRLY REV A/I 01MAY78
*ACTION ACTIVITY *ASSIGNMENT *DUE DATE *STATUS
TRA PROV ANALYSIS 01JUL78 CONTG
PROBLEM * STATUS *PROBLEM STATEMENT
210003 OPEN PERFORMANCE BASED ON LAUNCH WEIGHT
VERSUS RANGE
*SOURCE DOCUMENT *SOURCE DOCUMENT ID *SOURCE DOCUMENT DATE
QTRLY REV A/ I 01MAY7 8
*ACTION ACTIVITY *ASSIGNMENT *DUE DATE *STATUS
TRA CONDUCT TRADE-OFF 01JUL78 IN
PROCESS
PROBLEM *STATUS *PROBLEM STATEMENT
210004 OPEN PERFORMANCE TREND TRACKING SYS
*SOURCE DOCUMENT *SOURCE DOCUMENT ID *SOURCE DOCUMENT DATE




78PA01 PROBLEM NO 2000 02 7 JUN 78*
FIREBRAND PROGRAM
AVIONIC FUNCT DESC




DOC ID DOC DATE
QTRLY REV A/ I 01MAY78
PROBLEM
DESCRIPTION




Write a functional description of the operation of
the total avionics equipment.
ACTION TAKEN#:#31MAY78 - APC-6, ref (a), reported
that the Avionics sub-systems working group has
been requested to consolidate this and all other
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